Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents, and Their Children\u27s Rights as Children by Graham, Kathy T.
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 48 | Number 4 Article 8
1-1-2008
Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents, and
Their Children's Rights as Children
Kathy T. Graham
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Kathy T. Graham, Symposium, Same-Sex Couples: Their Rights as Parents, and Their Children's Rights as Children, 48 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 999 (2008).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol48/iss4/8
SAME-SEX COUPLES: THEIR RIGHTS AS




Fifty years ago, the American family usually consisted of
a married couple with children. When we thought of family,
we thought of relationships created by affinity, consanguinity,
or by adoption. Over the past years, the American family has
changed in a number of ways. Divorce has changed the fabric
of our society by transforming a number of families into
single parent families. Divorce is no longer an unusual
occurrence; in fact, it is commonplace.' After remarriage, the
family unit often transforms again with a new marital
partner becoming the stepparent to children from a previous
union.2 A number of parents also choose to have children
without marrying and choose to raise their children outside
marriage.3
Along with these changes, or perhaps in part because of
these changes, same-sex couples are more visible in our
society. Same-sex couples are creating family units that often
include children, either from a pre-existing heterosexual
relationship or children born during the same-sex
relationship. Sometimes, the children are conceived by one of
the partners through artificial means or the children may be
adopted. Today many children are being raised by same-sex
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Willamette University College of Law.
1. See Patricia H. Shiono & Linda Sandham Quinn, Epidemiology of
Divorce, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 15, 21-26 (1994) ("The changes in the
marriage, divorce, and remarriage rates over the past seventy years have had a
profound effect on the living arrangements of children. A growing number of
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couples in family units. Information from the 2000 census
counted about 594,000 same-sex households; twenty-seven
percent of those households included children. The total
number of children of same-sex couples totals at least
166,000.4
As a result of these changes in the American family, our
concept of family is changing. Much has been written about
the legal definition of marriage and whether it includes same-
sex partnerships. The federal government and the states
have examined this question and answered it in different
ways. The impact of these decisions on the parent-child
relationships included in same-sex families has not been the
primary focus of the discussion. This paper considers the
legal rights of same-sex partners as parents and the rights of
their children.
Given the unwillingness of courts and legislatures to
recognize same-sex partners as married, marriage and
divorce and parentage laws cannot provide same-sex partners
with the legal protection that heterosexual partners are
provided. Also, their children do not have the protection of
laws that establish parentage and legal obligations for care
and support.
For instance, a husband who is married at the time his
wife conceives and gives birth is presumed to be the father of
the child.5 Even if the husband is not the natural father, he
will be regarded as the natural father until some other man is
legally established as the child's father. If the father and
mother were not married, but cohabited and had a child
outside of marriage, a paternity action may be used to
establish the father-child relationship. 6
4. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-
PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000 (2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf; see also William Meezan &
Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America's Children,
15 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 97 (Fall 2005).
5. Most states have statutes that establish the paternity link between a
husband and a child born to his wife during marriage. See CAL. EVID. CODE §
621 (West 1995) ("[Tlhe issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not
impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.").
6. A paternity action is one way that the parent child connection can be
established between a father and a child if the parents are not married. See
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070 (2007) (listing a number of ways that the connection




But for a same-sex couple, it is not as easy to establish
the parent-child link for the parent who is not the natural
parent. The relationship between the natural mother and her
child defines the mother's relationship, but the other parent
may have no legal rights to custody of the child or no
responsibility for the child if the couple splits up. If the
second parent adopted the child, then she will be recognized
as the child's parent. Otherwise, the law does not protect the
relationship between the child and the non-birth parent in a
same-sex relationship.
The purpose of this article is to explore the legal
treatment of gay and lesbian parents. Part II discusses the
history of same-sex union recognition. Part III discusses the
legal rights of heterosexual parents. Part IV discusses how
the parent-child relationship is established for gay and
lesbian partners. Last, part V suggests proposals to recognize
parents' rights to their children, regardless of the two parent
partner's sex.
II. RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX UNIONS
For years, same-sex partners were not recognized or
protected by family law. In older American cases, gays and
lesbians were not successful in their efforts, but more
recently, they have had some success in attaining legal
protection. I Early cases rejected the conceptual notion that
marriage could be flexible enough to include same-sex unions.
8
A. State Court Decisions Providing Legal Protection to Same-
Sex Relationships
The states have addressed the protection of same-sex
relationships in a variety of ways. Three recent state supreme
court cases held a restriction on marriage to heterosexual
couples unconstitutional. The plaintiffs in these cases
argued, and the courts found, that such a marital restriction
7. See Developments in the Law; The Law of Marriage and Family, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2005-07 (2003); see also YUVAL MERIN, EQUALITY
FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF GAY
PARTNERSHIPS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 238-39 (2002).
8. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) ("The institution
of marriage is a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation
and rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis.").
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violated state constitutional provisions.9  The petitioners
argued that the restriction of marriage to heterosexual
couples violated the petitioners' rights to marry.
In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, ° the
Massachusetts Supreme Court stated that, "barring an
individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of
civil marriage solely because that person would marry a
person of the same sex violates the equal protection principles
contained in the Massachusetts Constitution."1 The benefits
conferred on married partners and denied to same-sex
partners include inheritance rights, contract rights, rights to
children born during the relationship and many other
benefits too numerous to list. The Massachusetts High Court
found it unconstitutional to have a marriage law that does
not provide the same benefits to same-sex partners as are
provided to heterosexual couples.
Two other state supreme court decisions found that the
failure to treat same-sex couples the same as heterosexual
couples violates state constitutional provisions and that an
adequate remedy to this disparity rests in according these
couples the same rights and responsibilities of marriage
without the status of marriage. In Baker v. State, the
Vermont Supreme Court held that under the state
constitution's common benefits clause, plaintiffs seeking
same-sex marriage are entitled to benefits and obligations
like those accompanying marriage, but the relationship can
be classified as a civil union instead of marriage. 2 So long as
same-sex partners have the same rights and responsibilities
as married couples, there is no violation of the constitutional
rights of same-sex couples. In the most recent case, Winslow
v. Harris, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the
state marriage law as violating state constitutional rights of
same-sex partners, but left it to the state legislature to
address the problem. 1
In support of the status quo in both cases, the states
argued that expanding marriage beyond heterosexual couples
9. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003);
Winslow v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999).
10. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941.
11. Id. at 969-70.
12. Baker, 744 A.2d at 864-913.
13. Winslow, 908 A.2d at 223.
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puts children at risk of being raised in less than optimal
circumstances. Yet, while the states argued that marriage
was the sacred institution for procreation, the states had to
concede that the concept of family has evolved to include
same-sex partners as parents. For instance, adoption laws
permit second-parent adoption by a same-sex partner. Other
laws and programs in these same states sanction parenting
by homosexual partners. Same-sex partners can either
become foster parents or give birth to their own children
through artificial insemination.
Many of the plaintiffs who challenged the marriage laws
in the three cases are parents. To them, the notion of family
includes same-sex parents raising children whether or not the
state recognizes same-sex marriage. Denying the parents the
right to marry deprives the children of the legal benefits
bestowed upon legally-recognized marriages and families. As
the courts in the cases noted, there are many benefits that
come under the umbrella of marriage law that inure to the
benefit of the children. The court in Goodridge states that
"[it cannot be rational under our laws, and indeed it is not
permitted, to penalize children by depriving them of State
benefits because the State disapproves of their parents'
sexual orientation."14 The court in Winslow v. Harris states:
Disparate treatment of committed same-sex couple,
moreover, directly disadvantages their children. We fail
to see any legitimate governmental purpose in disallowing
the child of a deceased same-sex parent survivor benefits
under the Worker's Compensations Act or Criminal
Injuries Compensation Act when children of married
parents would be entitled to such benefits. Nor do we see
the governmental purpose in not affording the child of a
same-sex parent, who is a volunteer firefighter or first-aid
responder, tuition assistance when the children of married
parents receive such assistance. There is something
distinctly unfair about the state recognizing the right of
same-sex couples to raise natural and adopted children
and placing foster children with those couples, and yet
denying those children the financial and social benefits
and privileges available to children in heterosexual
14. Id.
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households. 5
Thus, the courts in these cases either find the legal
concept of marriage must be expanded to include same-sex
marriage or the legislature must be directed to protect same-
sex partnerships in a manner tantamount to marriage. In
finding as they did, the courts were concerned with the lack of
legal protection afforded to same-sex couples, particularly in
light of the protection extended to heterosexual couples. In
part, the concern is related to the children of same-sex
couples.
B. State Court Decisions Denying Legal Protection to Same-
Sex Relationships
The Washington Supreme Court recently upheld state
provisions that prohibit same-sex marriages.16  In King
County v. Andersen, the court applied a rational basis test
because the plaintiffs had not adequately established gay and
lesbian persons as a suspect class. In deciding that the state
could lawfully restrict marriage to heterosexual couples, the
court stated, "[W]e conclude that limiting marriage to
opposite sex couples furthers the State's interests in
procreation and encouraging families with a mother and
father and children biologically related to both."17 In reaching
this conclusion, the court states that the highly deferential
rational basis inquiry sustains the restriction on marriage
given the state's goal of "encouraging procreation between
opposite-sex individuals within the framework of marriage." 8
The court accepted this as a legitimate government interest
furthered by limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. 9
Despite the holding'- that marriage may lawfully be
restricted to heterosexual couples, the court does "not dispute
that same-sex couples raise children" and that "same-sex
couples enter significant, committed relationships that
include children, whether adopted, conceived through
assisted reproduction, or brought within the family of the
same-sex couple after the end of a heterosexual
15. Id. at 218.
16. See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006).
17. Id. at 985.





The New York Court of Appeals considered the same
issue and found that the rights of same-sex couples were not
violated by a law that restricts marriage to heterosexual
couples. In Hernandez v. Robles,2' the court held that the
legislative restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples was
rational, and that rational basis scrutiny was applicable in
reviewing the state's marriage law since a fundamental right
was not at stake.22 The court concluded that, although the
right to marry was unquestionably a fundamental right, the
right to marry someone of the same sex was not. Thus, even
though same-sex couples raise children and have families, it
is nevertheless not a violation of same-sex partner's state or
federal constitutional rights to define marriage as a
relationship between heterosexual couples. Therefore, the
court concluded, heightened scrutiny of the law that limits
marriage to heterosexual couples is not required. Nor is
heightened scrutiny required because the law discriminates
on the basis of sex and on the basis of sexual preference. The
court says it is up to the legislature to amend the law if it
believes that same-sex couples should be able to marry.23
C. State Legislation Conferring Rights on Same-Sex Couples
Most states do not recognize the rights of same-sex
partners as analogous to marriage, but a handful of states
have enacted laws providing some protection to same-sex
partners. For instance, Vermont's Legislature enacted a law
that recognizes "civil unions" as identical to marriage but is
not described as marriage. Connecticut followed suit;
California and New Jersey have also enacted laws that create
a legal status for same-sex partners that are virtually
identical to marriage, but is not labeled as such.24
20. Id. at 985.
21. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); see also Li v. State, 110
P.3d 91 (Or. 2005) (holding that a restriction on marriage to opposite sex
couples is constitutional).
22. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 12.
23. Id. at 9 ("Our conclusion that there is a rational basis for limiting
marriage to opposite sex couples leads us to hold that that limitation is valid
under the New York Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, and that any
expansion of the traditional definition of marriage should come from the
Legislature.").
24. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004) ("Registered domestic
partners shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be
2008] 1005
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In many states that deny same-sex partners the right to
marry or to an equivalent status, the legislatures have
enacted laws giving same-sex couples some benefits including
rights regarding health care directives, adoption rights, rights
to care for foster children, and other rights with respect to
one another. 5 The list of rights and responsibilities that
subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law, whether
they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, government
policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted
to and imposed on spouses."); 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 05-10 ("[Plarties to a
civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities
under law, whether derived from the general statutes, administrative
regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other source of civil law,
as are granted to spouses in a marriage, which is defined as the union of one
man and one woman."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (2002) ("Parties to a
civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities
under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule,
policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in
a marriage."); H. B. 437-FN-LOCAL, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2007)
("Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the parties who enter into a
civil union pursuant to this chapter shall be entitled to all the rights and subject
to all the obligations and responsibilities provided for in state law that apply to
parties who are jointed together pursuant to RSA 457."); Assemb. B. 3787,
212th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2007) ("Parties to a civil union shall have all of the
same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive
from statue, administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any
other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage."); H. B. 2007,
74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) ("Any privilege, immunity, right or benefit
imposed by statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any
other law on an individual because the individual is or was married, or because
the individual is or was an in-law in a specified way to another individual, is
imposed on equivalent terms, substantive and procedural, on an individual
because the individual is or was in a domestic partnership or because the
individual is or was, based on a domestic partnership, related in a specified way
to another individual."). Although the Oregon law was to take effect on January
8, 2008, a federal district court judge temporarily blocked the law from taking
effect pending a review of constitutional issues. Both Washington and Maine
have enacted laws that provide more limited benefits and responsibilities to
same-sex couples. See also Public Laws of Me. 672, 121st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess.
(Me. 2003). Maine's law provides some benefits but not all to the domestic
partners. Included in the benefits are health decision-making authority,
protection under the domestic violence statutes and specific rights to inherit on
death of other partner without a will. Substitute S. B. 5336, 60th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2007) took effect on April 21, 2007 and provides some of the
benefits of marriage to same sex domestic partners including the opportunity to
register and to make health care decisions on behalf of the partner and to
inherit from the other partner when the partner dies without a will.
25. For instance, in Washington where the court denied same-sex couples
the right to marry, the court and the Legislature have provided limited
protection to same-sex couples. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.140(2) (2005)
(providing that any person may be an adoptive parent); Vasquez v Hawthorne,
33 P.3d 735 (Wash. 2001) (ruling on a claim to the estate of decedent brought by
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same-sex partners have acquired incrementally by statutory
and policy changes is legion; the list is too lengthy to mention
them all. In most states, same-sex partners have some of the
rights and some of the responsibilities of a spouse.26 Thus,
apart from the controversy regarding the meaning of
marriage and whether or not it is constitutionally acceptable
to leave same-sex couples out of the marriage law, many laws
and policies have changed to recognize the fact that many
households now consist of same-sex couples and their
families.
D. State and Federal Legislation that Prohibits Recognition
of Same-Sex Couples
In 1996, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA). This Act defines marriage as a legal union between
a male and a female. DOMA gives the states the authority to
decline to recognize same-sex relationships as marriage when
they otherwise would be required to do so pursuant to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.27
Approximately forty-five states have enacted laws that
restrict marriage to heterosexual couples. 2' Even in states
decedent's alleged gay life-partner); In re Dependency of G.C.B., 870 P.2d 1037
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (noting placement of a child in foster care with a same-
sex couple). Other states that do not extend full protection to same-sex couples
provide limited protection both as partners and as parents. See also HAW.
REV. STAT. § 572C-1 et seq. (2006) (laying out the Reciprocal Beneficiaries
Law); Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
26. Another example of this change has occurred in the private sector where
employers have recognized the need to provide for same-sex partners for gay
and lesbian employees. See Howard Paster, The Federal Marriage Amendment
Is Bad for Business, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2004, at B2 ("American businesses
have been changing their workplace policies, adding domestic partner benefits
and rethinking their corporate cultures since the early 1980s."). The author
says that forty percent of the Fortune 500 companies, including Shell Oil, BP,
the Big Three auto-makers, Lockheed Martin, General Electric, and Coca Cola
provide benefits for same-sex partners that are equivalent to those for
heterosexual partners. Id.
27. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2005) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, ... the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(2006) ("No State ... shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or
judicial proceeding of any other State . . .respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State ... or a right or claim arising from such relationship.").
28. See Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages
and Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2165
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that have enacted civil union or domestic partnership law, the
Legislature or the people may have defined marriage as a
heterosexual relationship.
III. ESTABLISHING THE PARENT/CHILD
RELATIONSHIP
The meaning of parent is defined as the "lawful father or
mother of someone." 9  As one author says, "the term
encompasses so much more today than just the biological
aspect of who was responsible for the child's conception and
birth." 0 As the author says, the term parent connotes a
"relationship of mutual love and affection between the
parents and the child and that the parents are the individuals
who are responsible for child support and maintenance,
instruction, discipline, and guidance of the child." "'
The following section discusses how the parent-child
relationship is established.
A. Biological Parent Recognized as Legal Parent
In most cases, a biological parent is also regarded as the
legal parent of a child. For mothers, this is always true
unless she gives the child up for adoption or her parental
rights are terminated. For fathers, although it may be a more
complicated evidentiary issue, the biological dad is the legal
father of his children. Biological parents are regarded as
legally responsible for their children.
Usually, fatherhood is established by virtue of marital
status at the time the child is conceived or is born. If the
child's mother gives birth to the child while she cohabits with
her husband, he is presumed to be the father of her child.
The marital presumption provides protection to the child, the
mother, and the father, because marriage provides a legal
father to the child.32 Even if the mother's husband is not the
(2005); Vanessa A. Lavely, The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage:
Reconciling the Inconsistencies Between Marriage and Adoption Cases, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 247 (2007).
29. John C. Duncan Jr., The Ultimate Best Interest of the Child Enures
From Parental Reinforcement: The Journey to Family Integrity, 83 NEB. L.
REV. 1240, 1247 (2005).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (2002) ("A man is presumed to be the
father of a child if: 1) he and the mother of the child were married to each other
[V01:481008
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natural father of her child, the marriage presumption gives
the child a legal father who must provide care and support for
the child. Although this presumption may be rebutted, if it is
not, the child's legal father owes the child the obligations of
parenthood. In some cases, undoubtedly, the legal father is
not the biological father, but that does not prevent the
presumption from creating a father-child bond.3
If the child's mother gives birth to a child outside of
marriage, fatherhood is established through a filiation
proceeding or by a voluntary acknowledgment of the child by
the father. Once paternity is established, the father is
responsible for the support of the child as well as entitled to
visitation and even perhaps to custody. 4
For the most part, the legal framework follows the
contours of the natural relationships between mother and
child, father and child, or mother's husband and child. Most
parent-child relationships are established by the marital
presumption or through a paternity process.
B. Establishing Parent-Child Relationship for Non-Natural
Parents
More and more children are being raised in families
where there are not two natural parents living together.
More and more children today are being raised in single-
parent homes, or with a parent and a step-parent.3 5  New
parenting relationships may be created with other caring
adults as a result of the changes in the family.
and the child is born during the marriage; 2) he and the mother of the child
were married to each other and the child is born within 300 days after the
marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or
divorce . . . ."). The 1973 version contained similar provisions about a marital
presumption. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (1973).
33. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
presumption in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). At the time
California had. a conclusive presumption favoring the husband of the mother
who were cohabiting at the time of the conception of the child. Id. The
presumption could be rebutted within two years of the child's birth by the
husband or by the mother of the child. Id. The court upheld the presumption
as constitutional. Id.
34. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 240 (2002) (providing that a man is
presumed to be a child's father if he has acknowledged the child as his own or a
paternity action establishes that he is the father of the child).
35. See Duncan, supra note 29, at 1246.
2008] 1009
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1. By Adoption
A parent-child relationship may also be established
through adoption. If the child's natural parents relinquish
their rights to a child, the child can be adopted by other
parents. Once the adoption is final, the child is regarded as
the natural child of his adoptive parents. The adoptive
parents are considered the child's legal parents. 6  The
natural parents lose all legal standing as parents and the
adoptive parents replace them. Legally, it is as if the child
was born to his adoptive parents.
2. Creating a Parent-Child Bond from the Stepparent
Relationship
Laws in some jurisdictions provide that stepparents are
obligated to provide support for the children of their spouses
while the marriage lasts and while the children reside in the
stepparents' home." If the children reside with the
stepparent, a stepparent may stand in loco parentis to his or
her spouse's children during their marriage, but this
relationship terminates on divorce. Once the stepparent is
divorced from the natural parent, the obligation to provide
support and the in loco parentis relationship terminates.
Adoption is also a possibility. If the stepparent adopts
the child through a stepparent adoption process, the bond is
36. See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.050 (2007) ("An adopted child bears the same
relation to adoptive parents and their kindred in every respect pertaining to the
relation of parent and child as the adopted child would if the adopted child were
the natural child of such parents.").
37. Although a majority of states adhere to the common law rule that holds
that stepparents have no duty to support their stepchildren, about twenty
states do require some support in some circumstances. See MO. REV. STAT. §
568.040 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-217 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-09-09 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A-1 (2006); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW Art. 3-A § 31 (McKinney 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 15 (West
2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.053 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8
(2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (2002).
38. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 352 (2007) ("In order for a person to be
regarded as a stepparent, he or she must be married to the natural parent of
the child. A stepparent does not, merely by reason of the relation, stand in loco
parentis to the stepchild. Accordingly, at common law, the relationship between
a stepparent and stepchild does not of itself confer any rights or impose any
duties upon either party. A stepparent who lives with his or her spouse and the
spouse's natural children may assume the relationship of in loco parentis, and
the rights and responsibilities that arise where a spouse elects to stand in loco
parentis to the other spouse's child or children. The status of loco parentis for a
stepparent terminates upon divorce.").
1010 [Vol:48
2008] SAME-SEX COUPLES 1011
the same as if the stepparent was the natural parent. 9 Many
states created the stepparent adoption process as an
exception to the ordinary adoption where the child's legal
connection to both parents is severed when the child is
adopted. In a stepparent adoption, the child keeps his or her
relationship with one parent and is legally adopted by that
parent's spouse.
3. In Loco Parentis Doctrine
A parent child relationship may be established by
someone other than a natural parent through the in loco
parentis doctrine. The in loco parentis doctrine refers to a
situation where a person puts himself in the position of a
lawful parent by assuming the obligations of a parent without
going through a formal adoption process.4 ° Although the
tradition in the common law is that natural parents have a
superior right to their children, a natural parent could lose
custody of a child if it is shown that the natural parent is
unfit or it would be detrimental to the child's interests to give
custody to the natural parent.4' In some cases, the natural
39. Lavely, supra note 28, at 264 ([Als divorce and remarriage become
increasing commonplace during the twentieth century, states began to carve out
stepparent adoptions in their adoption statutes.") (footnote omitted).
40. See In re C.B., 861 A.2d 287 (Pa. 2004); 28 AM. JUR. 2d Proof of Facts §
545 (2007).
41. A majority of states follow a rule that creates a presumption in favor of
a parent that may be rebutted by proof of parental unfitness, neglect or
exceptional circumstances. See C.G. v. C.G., 594 So. 2d 147, 149 (Ala. Civ. App.
1991); In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action N. JD-05401, 845 P.2d 1129, 1136
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); In re Guardianship of D.A. McW, 460 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla.
1984); Carvalho v. Lewis, 274 S.E.2d 471, 472 (Ga. 1981); Stockwell v.
Stockwell, 775 P.2d 611, 613 (Idaho 1989); In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 334-
35 (Ill. 1995); In re Guardianship of Williams, 869 P.2d 661, 669 (Kan. 1994);
Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Ky. 1989); Sider v. Sider, 639 A.2d
1076, 1086 (Md. 1994); White v. Thompson, 569 So. 2d 1181, 1183-84 (Miss.
1990); Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Mo. 1998); In re Guardianship of
K.M., 929 P.2d 870, 873 (Mont. 1996); Locklin v. Duka, 929 P.2d 930, 933 (Nev.
1996); Watkins v. Nelson, 748 A.2d 558 (N.J. 2000); In re Adoption of J.J.B., 894
P.2d 994, 1008 (N.M. 1995); Merritt v. Way, 446 N.E.2d 776, 777 (N.Y. 1983); In
re Woodell, 117 S.E.2d 4, 7 (N.C. 1960); In re E.J.H., 546 N.W.2d 361, 364 (N.D.
1996); In re Guardianship of M.R.S., 960 P.2d 357, 361-62 (Okla. 1998); Ryan v.
DeMello, 354 A.2d 734, 735 (R.I. 1976); Moore v. Moore, 386 S.E.2d 456, 458
(S.C. 1989); D.G. v D.M.K., 557 N.W.2d 235, 243 (S.D. 1996); In re Adoption of
Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tenn. 1995); Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d
824, 827 (Va. 1986); In re S.B.L., 553 A.2d 1078, 1082 (Vt. 1988); Snyder v.
Scheerer, 436 S.E.2d 299, 304 (W. Va. 1993); In re the Guardianship of Jenae
K.S., 539 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). In five states, the court may
also rely on a showing that parental custody would be detrimental to the child.
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parent may consent to the placement of his or her child with
someone else for some period of time.
In these rare cases where a natural parent either
consents to or is forced to give another person custody rights
to his or her child, the natural parent continues to have legal
rights to the child unless parental rights are terminated. In
these situations, the natural parent shares his or her rights
with others who have provided care for the child. But the
natural parent is presumed to have the superior right to care
for and have custody of the child. If the natural parent no
longer is willing to share the child with the adult who has
assumed the role of parent, the natural parent is entitled to
make that choice.
4. By New Reproductive Technology
New reproductive technologies make it possible for
women to conceive children through artificial insemination
without a male partner. The advent of the new reproductive
technology forces us to reckon with the rights of parental
partners who are not natural parents of their partners'
children.
The original artificial insemination by donor (AID) cases
deal with a married woman whose husband is infertile, but
nevertheless desires a child. She becomes pregnant via
artificial insemination and gives birth; her husband is
regarded as the natural and legal father of the child. This is
true despite the fact that the child's genetic identity is
unrelated to her husband.42 This reflects a policy that the
See Carter v. Novotny, 779 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Alaska 1989); Nancy S. v. Michele
G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); In re Custody of C.C.R.S.,
892 P.2d 246, 248 (Colo. 1995); Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah
1982); In re Marriage of Allen, 626 P.2d 16, 23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981). Four
states combine the exceptional circumstances test with the best interests test to
determine the custody of a minor child when a natural parent and a third party
are vying for custody. See Freshour v. West, 971 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ark. 1998);
Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Minn. 1989); Stanley D. v. Deborah D.,
467 A.2d 249, 251 (N.H. 1983); Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.2d 1255, 1257 (Pa.
2000); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 823 (Wyo. 1970). A very small minority of
states (three) apply a rule that applies a best-interests test in all disputes
between a parent and nonparent. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(2) (Supp.
1995) ("Custody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother
whenever the award serves the best interests of the child."); Soumis v. Soumis,
553 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Miller v. Miller, 621 N.E.2d 745, 747
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
42. Many states have established that when a married woman receives
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AID procedure is designed to create a family unit and that
the best interests of the child are fulfilled by giving the child
a relationship with two parents.43 Today, of course, AID is
used by unmarried women who desire to have children either
without a partner or perhaps with a same-sex partner.
Another possibility is that a child may be created through
in vitro fertilization. The 2002 Uniform Parentage Act
includes a provision that limits the ability of a husband to
challenge his status as the father of a child born through this
procedure. Again, the law is designed to recognize the
mother's husband as the father of the child if the mother is
married at the time of the procedure and the birth of the
child." If there is no husband or partner, then there is no
other parent in the eyes of the law because a donor is not
considered a legal parent of a child born through assisted
reproduction.
Another kind of assisted reproduction is through a
surrogate who agrees to implantation of an embryo which
consists of an egg and sperm or may consist of sperm that
unites with an egg from the surrogate.45  Complicated
questions arise about the relationships created in these
situations. The 2002 Uniform Parentage Act provides some
guidance by upholding the parties' intentions when they
contract a gestational agreement that provides for the child's
birth and their rights as the child's parents.46
artificial insemination in order to conceive and produce a child, her husband is
legally regarded as the natural and lawful father of the child even though the
biological father is someone else. See People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal.
1968); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. 1963); see also OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.243 (2005) ("The relationship, rights and obligation between
a child born as a result of artificial insemination and the mother's husband
shall be the same to all legal intents and purposes as if the child had been
naturally and legitimately conceived by the mother and the mother's husband if
the husband consented to the performance of artificial insemination.").
43. See K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981).
44. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002) (noting that a donor is not a
parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction); UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 705(a) (2002) ("Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(b), the husband of a wife who gives birth to a child by means of assisted
reproduction may not challenge his paternity of the child unless: (1) within two
years after learning of the birth of the child he commences a proceeding to
adjudicate his paternity; and (2) the court finds that he did not consent to the
assisted reproduction, before of after the birth of the child.").
45. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7610, 7613, 7570 (West 2004); In re Marriage
of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
46. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(a) (2002).
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The laws that define the parent-child relationship for
children conceived and born with reproductive technology
include provisions that cut off the legal rights of the natural
parents. The purpose of these laws is to give effect to the
intention of the parties to create a parent-child relationship
where it otherwise would not exist.
Most parent-child relationships are created by virtue of
the natural relationship that exists between the child and the
parents. Most of the time, a child is born into a family unit
that consists of married parents or unmarried parents who
cohabit. Even when that is not the case, paternity law
creates a mechanism for creating the legal bond between a
natural father and his child.
The parent bond may also be created in situations where
another person becomes the child's parent or assumes the role
of parent when the natural parent is unwilling or unable to
do so. We have seen several examples of laws that
accomplish this, particularly examples involving reproductive
technology. In AID, the genetic father may be unwilling to do
any more than provide the sperm to enable a woman to have
a child. He is not interested in assuming the responsibilities
of fatherhood.
The term "parent" means more than the biological link
between a child and his natural parent. It is important to
keep this in mind as we examine parenthood in the context of
same-sex families.
III. RECOGNITION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN GAY
RELATIONSHIPS
Same-sex couples are "changing the portrait of the
American family and the landscape of family law."47 A recent
47. Tiffany L. Palmer, Family Matters: Establishing Legal Parental Rights
For Same-Sex Parents and Their Children, 30 HUM. RTS. 9 (2003); see also
Heather Farm Latham, Desperately Clinging to the Cleavers: What Family Law
Courts are Doing About Homosexual Parents, and What Some are Refusing to
See, 29 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 223 (2005) ("The law has traditionally
recognized only 'three essential categories of parent': biological, step, and
adoptive. Homosexual couples by biological definition are unable to procreate
together, although through modern reproductive technology they are very often
able to create both a child and at least one legal parent for their families.
Stepfamilies are equally barred, although instead of by natural law by a
construct considered by many to represent natural law: the refusal of states to
acknowledge marriage between homosexuals. The combination of these two
high fences for homosexuals who desire parenthood have proven a most
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article discusses the complexity of same-sex families. The
article describes the many different ways that a child may
come into a same-sex family unit. The authors describe the
different ways:
In many cases (no one knows how many), children living
with gay and lesbian couples are the biological offspring of
one member of the couple, whether by an earlier marriage
or relationship, by arrangement with a known or
anonymous sperm donor (in the case of lesbian couples), or
by arrangement with a surrogate birth mother (in the case
of male couples). 48
Yet, we seem not to have figured out a way to recognize
the relationships created in these families with their children.
To the extent we have been unable to connect these children
with both of their parents, we put these children at risk of not
having as secure a childhood as they otherwise might.
The following is a summary of current law that defines
the parent-child relationship between children and their gay
or lesbian parents.
A. Recognizing Gay and Lesbian Natural Parents' Rights
A gay or lesbian parent's status as a natural parent to his
or her child is no different than that of a heterosexual parent.
In some cases, a gay or lesbian parent may be in a
heterosexual relationship when the parent has a child. Later,
perhaps that parent either divorces the other parent or
establishes a new relationship with a same-sex partner.
Although a parent's status does not change if the parent
becomes involved in a gay or lesbian relationship, it is
possible that the relationship could affect the custody or
visitation rights of the natural parent. The trend in case law
is to consider the homosexual conduct of a natural parent
only if that conduct has an adverse effect on the child. Courts
apply the same standard to heterosexual conduct of a parent.
A minority of courts consider a parent's homosexuality a
unwieldy course: Many couples create families through surrogacy or donor
insemination (or both) but still find themselves unable to secure parental rights
for both partners due to the fact that joint adoption very often statutorily
requires marriage. In one great sweep, then, the legal system denies
homosexuals the opportunity to make formal commitments to one another and
denies them parental status-due to their not making such a commitment."
(footnote omitted)).
48. See Meezan & Rauch, supra note 4, at 99.
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sufficient reason for restricting the visitation and custody
rights of the parent without a showing of any adverse effect
on the child. 4
B. Recognition of Gay or Lesbian Partner's Parental Rights
1. Rights of a Natural Parent Partner Versus a Non-
Natural Parent Partner
In many gay and lesbian families, one of the partners
49. There have been a number of cases and statutes that are relevant to this
issue. For example, a number of the states have statutes and/or case law that
restricts the courts' ability to consider "marital status, income, social
environment or life style of either party" only if the factor is causing or may
cause emotional or physical damage to the child. See OR. REV. STAT. §
107.137(3) (2007); see also S.N.E. v. R.L.B, 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) (finding
that a person's sexual orientation and status as a partner in a same-sex
relationship are insufficient bases upon which to deny custody to a parent);
Downery v. Muffley, 767 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the
sexual preferences of parents relevant only if the evidence can connect that with
harm to the children); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980)
(finding that the mother's sexual orientation is not an automatic disqualifier
from her receiving custody); Hassenstab v. Hassenstab, 570 N.W.2d 368 (Neb.
Ct. App. 1997) (finding no harmful effect on the daughter from exposure to
mom's homosexual relationship); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1979) (holding that it is in the child's best interests to remain with the
defendant even though she is homosexual); Paul C. v. Tracy C., 209 A.D.2d 955
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (noting that the mother's sexual preference of woman not
determinative in a custody dispute); Inscoe v. Inscoe, 700 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that there was no evidence that father's sexual orientation
had directly and adversely affected his son and father's sexual preference alone
is not sufficient basis for modifying custody); Stroman v. Williams, 353 S.E.2d
704 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the fact that mother is a lesbian can only
be considered to the extent that it directly or indirectly impacts welfare of the
child); VanDriel v. VanDriel, 525 N.W.2d 37 (S.D. 1994) (holding that the
mother's lesbian relationship does not per se disqualify mother from having
custody); In re Parsons, 914 S.W.2d 889 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the
key consideration is whether or not a parent's sexual orientation adversely
affects the children); In re Wicklund, 932 P.2d 652 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting that the father's homosexuality does not disqualify him from caring for
his children unless it would endanger his children). Some cases have held that
the gay or lesbian life style and exposure of the child to it constitutes an
adequate basis for restricting that parent's contact with the child. See Ex Parte
H. H., 830 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 2002) (recognizing that homosexuality has a
detrimental effect on children); Morris v. Morris, 783 So. 2d 681 (Miss. 2001)
(finding that sexual orientation can be considered in making a custody
determination so long as it is considered along with other factors); Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 2001 Tex. App. Lexis 3116 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a gay
parent's visitation could be restricted given his "paramour's" presence at his
home); Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996) (reversing a custody
determination to lesbian mom in part because father would "serve as a better
moral example" because of mom's cohabitation with lesbian partner).
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brings children into the relationship from a previous
heterosexual relationship that ended. So, the children may
have two natural parents, one of whom is the custodial parent
who now lives with a gay or lesbian partner. The analogous
heterosexual relationship is that of stepparent to child in the
context of the remarriage of a parent.
As is true with respect to a natural parent and a
stepparent, the law favors the natural parents over the
partner. Not surprisingly, a natural parent who has custody
would lose custodial rights only if proven to be unfit or it is
proven that it will be detrimental to the child's interests to
give custody to the natural parent.50  And even then the
noncustodial parent would likely have rights superior to the
rights of the gay or lesbian partner.
The basis for this right resides, in part, in the U.S.
Constitution. It gives parents a priority over third persons
who might seek custody of the natural parents' children.5' As
the court said in Troxel v. Granville, the right to raise one's
children is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Constitution. The natural parent's rights are superior to the
rights of others who may have performed parenting functions,
but at the behest and with the consent of the natural parent.
If there is a conflict between the natural parent and the other
party, the natural parent will prevail.
Assume that mother A and father B were married when
50. See supra text and cases accompanying note 41.
51. See Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329, 330 (1989) ("The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that parents have fundamental, basic and
constitutionally protected rights to raise their own children and that any attack
by third persons (and we would include grandparents in that category) seeking
to abrogate that right must show unfitness by 'clear and convincing evidence.'").
In Sheppard v. Sheppard, the court declared a statute that required the court to
apply a best interests standard instead of one that gave parents a preference
unconstitutional. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121 (Kan. 1981). In so
doing, the court said:
The United States Supreme Court recently recognized the
fundamental nature of the relationship between parent and
child in two cases, both of which involve the rights of natural
parents of illegitimate children. What we hold here is simply
this: that a parent who is not found to be unfit has a
fundamental right, protected by the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution, to care, custody and control of his
or her child, and that the right of such a parent to custody of
the child cannot be taken away in favor of a third person,
absent a finding of unfitness on the part of the parents.
Id. at 1125-28 (citation omitted).
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mother gave birth to her child X. Several years later, mother
divorced father and later moved in with lesbian partner C.
Assume further that partner C became attached to X and
cares for her and treats her like a daughter. Several years
later, the relationship breaks up and A and C go their
separate ways. C requests a court to create a joint parenting
plan with A for the care of X. She asks for liberal visitation
with X.
In many states, C's requests will be denied and she may
not have standing to challenge these issues. Even if father B
has not spent a great deal of time with X, B retains his rights
as a parent to the child unless he had surrendered his child
for adoption by C, which he had not done in this case.
One recent case, In re Thompson,52 held that, under
Tennessee law, a same-sex partner lacked standing to be
considered a parent and claim visitation rights with the child.
The court so held despite facts showing that the lesbian
partners had agreed to co-parent the child and in the event of
a separation had agreed that the partner would have
visitation rights. 3 The two partners lived together in a long-
term relationship and planned for the birth of the child while
they lived together. In reaching this result, while the court
was concerned with the father's custody and visitation rights,
as well as the fact that he had not agreed to the co-parenting
arrangement, the court seemed most concerned with the fact
that the mother's lesbian partner lacked standing under the
statutes to seek rights as a parent. 4
52. In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); see also
Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
53. In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 916. The agreement provided:
Each party acknowledges and agrees that both parties will
share in providing (J.C.) with the necessary food, clothing,
shelter, medical or any other remedial care that may be needed
by the child until the time (J.C.) is 18 years of age. Each party
acknowledges and agrees that if Debbie Lynn Coke and
MaryHelen Looper are no longer living together in the family
home they will both continue to provide for (J.C.) in the manner
described below: a. Legal custody of the child would remain in
the biological parent, Debbie Lynn Coke/ b. Mary Helen Looper
would have reasonable visitation; c. Mary Helen Looper would
have no financial obligations to (J.C.) ....
Id.
54. Id. at 918-19 ("While it may be true that in our society the term 'parent'
has become used at times to describe more loosely a person who shares mutual
love and affection with a child and who supplies care and support to the child,
we find it inappropriate to legislate judicially such a broad definition of the term
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Because the lesbian partner did not meet the statutory
definition of parent, the court concluded that the partner did
not have standing to raise a custody or visitation issue and
was therefore barred from making a claim for parenting time.
The court's failure to grant some parental rights to the former
lesbian partner parallels a court's unwillingness to consider
the rights of a stepparent at divorce. Neither parent figure
has the status of a natural parent and cannot expect to be
protected if their relationship to the natural parent ends. In
sum, their relationship with the child is connected to their
relationship to the child's natural parent.
2. Recognition of Same-Sex Partner's Parental Rights by
Adoption
In increasing numbers, gay and lesbian couples are
having children. In lesbian couples, this arrangement usually
means that one partner is the natural parent who was
artificially inseminated. The other lesbian partner is not
related to the child by blood, but becomes a mother either by
virtue of the family relationships established by the couple or
adoption.
Some states allow the second parent adoption process to
be used by gay and lesbian couples. The adoption enables the
non-natural parent to be regarded as a legal parent to the
child. If questions arise about support, custody, or visitation,
both parents are on the same footing with respect to the
rights and responsibilities surrounding the child.55
'parent' as relating to legal rights relating to child custody and/or visitation.
Just as a grandparent who provides care and support to a child does not become
recognized as being a parent (absent adoption) under Tennessee law, other
persons are not recognized as being a parent under Tennessee law based only
upon prior care and support of a child .... Accordingly, we conclude that, based
upon the statutory right of parents to custody and control of their minor
children, Tennessee law does not provide for any award of custody or visitation
to a nonparent except as may be otherwise provide by our legislature."). Accord
In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that there was no
standing for the petitioner to seek visitation rights with a child born to her
partner during a long-term lesbian relationship).
55. See In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that the unmarried
partner of a child's biological parent had standing to adopt the child); In re
Adoption of Carolyn B., 6 A.D.3d 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (clarifying that Slip
Op. 01860 allows two unmarried same sex partners to have standing to adopt a
child); see also In re Adoption of Baby Z., 699 A.2d 1065 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996)
(holding that the adoption review board must approve inclusion of a lesbian
partner as a statutory parent before the partner could be treated like a
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In a typical second-parent adoption, one parent has
already established a legal parent relationship with the child.
The second parent, in this case, the same-sex partner,
petitions the court to adopt the child. The petitioner asks the
court to grant the adoption without terminating the rights of
the first parent. As one author points out, "[i]n many states,
an adoption cannot be granted without terminating the
existing legal parents' rights. The exception to this is
'stepparent adoption,' in which the first parent and the
petitioner are married and the parent consents to the
adoption."56 Although the trend appears to be in favor of
allowing second-parent adoptions, there are a handful of
states that expressly prohibit second-parent adoptions for
same-sex couples.5 7  (Another option is for the same-sex
couple to adopt together; while some jurisdictions do not allow
this, others do.)5"
Some states that permit same-sex couple adoptions
through the second-parent adoption process do not give legal
recognition to same-sex partnerships through marriage, civil
union or partnership law. There is, as one author says, an
odd "irony" to the inconsistent positions taken in some
jurisdictions. 9
3. Recognition of Rights Through De Facto or
stepparent for adoption).
56. See Palmer, supra note 47, at 10 ("Second-parent adoptions are
currently available by statute or appellate court decisions in ten states:
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts,
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. Second-parent adoptions
are also available in counties in at least fifteen other states."); see also In re
Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
57. Palmer, supra note 47, at 10 ("Colorado, Ohio, Nebraska and Wisconsin
have held that [second parent] adoptions [by a same-sex partner] are not
permitted.").
58. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Moral Realism and the Adoption of Children by
Homosexuals, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 651 (2004).
59. Lavely, supra note 28, at 287 ("Similarly, the results of various adoption
cases undermine the optimal setting argument. Given that some courts in
adoption cases have redefined the optimal setting as one in which a child has
'two adults dedicated to his welfare, secure in their loving partnership, and
determined to raise him to the very best of their considerable abilities,' courts in
marriage cases should not insist that only a married man and woman can
provide an ideal home for a child. If courts admit the irony inherent in
accepting the procreation-marriage and optimal-setting arguments while also
granting same-sex adoptions, then they may be willing to reconcile these two




If the same-sex partners have no adoption option
available to them as a couple, they may decide that one of
them will give birth to a child, or one of the partners will
adopt a child. The partner who is not the natural or adoptive
parent may have no legal rights vis-a-vis the other
parent/partner when their partnership ends. At that point,
the partner who is not the natural or adoptive parent does not
have legally-recognized rights to the child. The partner will
have to rely on equitable theories seeking protection of the
relationship he or she established with the child.
For instance, in several recent cases, a state court has
considered the rights of the non-natural parent as a
psychological or a de facto parent given the relationship the
partner established with the child. In a few cases, the court
said that the non-parent has no standing to raise issues of
custody or visitation.6 0
Courts are becoming more willing to consider the
parental rights of a lesbian partner after the breakup of her
relationship. In order to establish standing, the person
seeking a right to custody or visitation will need a statute
that gives the court the authority to award rights to someone
other than a natural parent.61 Once a non-natural parent
establishes standing, the issue of the non-natural parent's
rights relative to the natural parent is considered.
If the jurisdiction has a statute conferring authority upon
the court to hear a claim by a non-natural parent, the issue
becomes what standard the court will employ to weigh the
rights of the natural parent against the rights of the non-
natural parent. In assessing the rights of the non-natural
parent, the court must be cognizant of the constitutional right
of a parent to raise a child as he or she so chooses. On the
other hand, if the parent has allowed a relationship to
develop between the child and the parent's gay or lesbian
partner, that partner may be considered a psychological
60. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In
re C.B.L., 723 N.E. 2d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Coons-Andersen v. Andersen 104
S.W.3d 630 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003). In all three of these cases, the court denies a
lesbian partner standing to raise issues of visitation and custody of a child born
during a lesbian relationship.
61. See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 552 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding
standing because Colorado's statutes specifically authorize nonparents to seek
parental responsibilities).
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parent and it may be harmful to deprive the child of the
ongoing relationship with that person. The focus is not on the
rights of the non-natural parent per se, bur rather on the
interests of the child's life in ensuring that an important
relationship is able to continue even though the child's parent
has ended his or her partnership with that person.62 The
doctrine of psychological parent or de facto parent is applied
to protect the interests of a child who needs the continued
relationship with the non-parent.
Another case focused on the reliance that a partner had
on a former partner's willingness to undertake the obligations
of parenthood with the natural parent. Because the partner
had agreed to become a parent although she was not a
natural parent, the court held that the doctrine of persons in
loco parentis could bind the former partner to the obligations
of parenthood after the parties separated.63 The court said
that the doctrine applied to situations where a person
assumed the status of a parent, and in that capacity
discharged the duties of a parent.64
Several recent California cases deal with the rights of a
lesbian partner who is not the biological mother of a child, but
nevertheless cohabited with the child's natural parent and
held herself out as the child's parent. In each of these cases,
the California Supreme Court confirms the rights of a lesbian
mother to have the legal rights of a natural mother. Each
case raises different legal issues, but all reach the same
conclusion about the existence of co-equal parenting rights of
a same-sex partner with the birth partner.
The first case is Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado
62. Id. at 559 ("Some courts have set forth a more specific four-factor test to
determine whether a nonparent is a psychological parent: (1) the legal parent
consented to and fostered the nonparent's formation and establishment of a
parent-like relationship between the nonparent and the child; (2) the
nonparent and the child lived together in the same household; (3) the nonparent
assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the
child's care, education and development, including contributing towards the
child's support, without expectation of financial compensations, and (4) the
nonparent has established a parental role sufficient to create with the child a
bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.").
63. L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding that the
persons in loco parentis doctrine bound the non-natural parent to pay child
support for five children born to her former partner during the time that the




County.65 In this case two mothers agreed to raise their
children together in a partnership. The two partners, Elisa
and Emily, began living together six months after they met in
1993. They both wanted children; because Elisa earned
substantially more income than Emily, they agreed that
Emily would be the stay-at-home mother. Both were
artificially inseminated; Elisa gave birth to her child in
November of 1997 while Emily gave birth to twins in March
of the next year. One of Emily's twins was born with Down's
Syndrome.
For a period of time, the partners lived together and held
themselves out as mothers to all the children. Elisa worked
outside the home to support the family while Emily remained
in the home caring for the children.
The couple separated in November 1999. At the time of
separation, Elisa promised to provide support to Emily and
the twins "as much as she could" and she initially paid the
mortgage and other expenses. Eventually, Elisa stated she
could no longer support the children. An action ensued to
collect child support from Elisa for the support of Emily's
children.
Although the couple did not register as a domestic
partnership and although Elisa did not adopt the children,
the court found that she is a parent under the Uniform
Parentage Act and may be held responsible for the support of
her former partner's children. The court considered section
7611 of the Act, which provides several ways in which a man
may be considered the father of a child.66
One of the ways that a man can be presumed to be the
natural father of a child is if he receives the child into his
home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.67
The court construed this statute to apply to mothers who, like
Elisa, entered into a lesbian partnership and committed to a
65. Elisa B. v. Superior Court of El Dorado County, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal.
2005).
66. Id. ("Section 7611 provides several circumstances in which '[a] man is
presumed to be the natural father of a child,' including: if he is the husband of
the child's mother, is not impotent or sterile, and was cohabiting with her
(Section 7540); if he signs a voluntary declaration of paternity stating he is the
'biological father of the child' (Section 7574, subd. (a)(6)); and if '[hIe receives the
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relationship with children born to their lesbian partner. The
court states:
Elisa is a presumed mother of the twins . . . because she
received the children into her home and openly held them
out as her natural children, and this is not an appropriate
action in which to rebut the presumption that Elisa is the
twins' parent with proof that she is not the children's
biological mother because she actively participated in
causing the children to be conceived with the
understanding that she would raise the children as her
own together with the birth mother, she voluntarily
accepted the rights and obligations of parenthood after
the children were born, and there are no competing claims
to her being the children's second parent.68
In the case of K.M. v. E.G., the California Supreme Court
issued another decision further defining the rights of same-
sex partners as parents.69 The issue in this case arose when
two lesbian partners made arrangements to have one partner,
K.M., donate her egg to respondent E.G., the gestational
mother of the children. At the time of the procedure the
couple lived together, and E.G. gave birth to twin girls during
their relationship.
When K.M agreed to donate her egg, E.G. accepted on the
condition that K.M. sign a consent form for ovum donors that
provided the donor would "waive any right and relinquish any
claim to the donated eggs or any pregnancy or offspring that
might result from them."7 ° Despite K.M.'s signature on the
form, she stated that she "thought she was going to be a
parent."71
E.G. gave birth to twins in 1995; the couple's relationship
ended in March 2001. K.M. then sued. The California
Supreme Court found that although K.M. had signed the
68. Id. at 670.
69. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
70. Id. at 676 ("[Tlhe form states on the third page .... I agree that the
recipient may regard the donated eggs and any offspring resulting therefrom as
her own children.... on page 4 of the form, above K.M.'s signature and the
signature of a witness, the agreement also states: 'I specifically disclaim and
waive any right in or any child that may be conceived as a result of the use of
any ovum or egg of mine, and I agree not to attempt to discover the identity of
the recipient thereof.' E.G. signed another part of the form that stated: 'I
acknowledge that the child or children produced by the IVF procedure is and
shall be my own legitimate child or children and the heir or heirs of my body




agreement giving up her right as a parent, that agreement
did not bar her from being regarded as a parent to her
partner's twins. The court stated:
A woman who supplies ova to be used to impregnate her
lesbian partner, with the understanding that the resulting
child will be raised in their joint home, cannot waive her
responsibility to support that child. Nor can such a
purported waiver effectively cause that woman to
relinquish her parental rights. 72
In reaching this decision, the court considered the impact
of a statute that deals with men who provide semen for
artificial insemination and found that it did not apply in this
situation." In the decision, the court affirmed the point that
two women may be regarded as parents of the same children.
In the final companion case, the Supreme Court dealt
with another situation involving the claims of a lesbian
parent. In this case, the lesbian parents sought and obtained
a stipulated judgment recognizing both parents as "the only
legally recognized parents of said child," and Lisa as "the
legal second mother/parent of the unborn child. '74
The stipulated judgment declared that Kristine and Lisa
"are the only legally recognized parents of (the unborn child)
and take full and complete legal, custodial and financial
responsibility of said child."75
When the child was almost two years old, the parties
ended their relationship and Lisa filed a motion to set aside
the stipulated judgment that declared her to be the child's
mother. The court found her estopped from challenging the
validity of the judgment entered before her child was born.76
72. Id. at 682.
73. Id. at 678 ("[W~e agree that K.M. is a parent of the twins because she
supplied the ova that produced the children, and Family Code section 7613,
subdivision (b) (hereafter section 7613(b)), which provides that a man is not a
father if he provides semen to a physician to inseminate a woman who is not his
wife, does not apply because K.M. supplied her ova to impregnate her lesbian
partner in order to produce children who would be raised in their joint home.").
74. Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690, 692 (Cal. 2005) ("[A] judgment was
filed in superior court declaring that Kristine is the 'biological, genetic and legal
mother/parent,' of the unborn child and shall have joint custody with her
'partner' Lisa, that Lisa 'is the second mother/parent' of the unborn child and
shall have joint custody with Kristine, and ordering that the child's birth
certificate list Kristine as 'mother' and that Lisa 'be listed in the space provided
for 'father."').
75. Id.
76. Id. at 695 ("Kristine invoked the jurisdiction of the superior court to
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In finding the defendant estopped from denying the terms of
the stipulated judgment, the court found that the parent had
availed herself of the Family Code section that enables a
person to be declared a parent before the child is born, and by
taking advantage of that procedure, Lisa could not seek to
declare that proceeding invalid.
In its willingness to affirm the stipulated judgment
declaring Lisa as the second parent to the child, the court
stated that since she took advantage of the code section
recognizing fathers before their children are born, there is no
reason not to treat Lisa the same as a father in that situation.
Therefore, the stipulated judgment stood.
What sets these cases apart from other cases dealing
with parental rights of same-sex partners is this: The court
declared that a lesbian partner has the same rights and
responsibilities as a natural parent using statutes
traditionally reserved for natural fathers. In others words,
these cases recognize that a child can legally have two
natural mothers, one the biological mother and the other
acknowledged as the natural mother. Accordingly, the
lesbian partner does not acquire these rights through
adoption; an adoption is unnecessary so long as the parent
follows the requirements of the law that traditionally were
used to establish the father-child relationship.
4. Establishing Parenthood by Partnership Laws
The California cases are not based on the relationship
established by the domestic partnership law. Given that
several states including California have enacted partnership
laws making it possible for same-sex couples to register and
create a relationship similar to marriage, the creation of the
relationship may also trigger parental rights to a child born
during the relationship. The same could also be true in
Massachusetts where same-sex marriages are allowed.
A recent Vermont case, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,
considered the rights of a partner seeking visitation rights
based on her claimed status as a parent, which arose from her
determine the parentage of the unborn child under the Uniform Parentage Act.
The court thus had subject matter jurisdiction. Family Code section 7630,
subdivision (b), provides that 'Any interested party may bring an action at any
time for the purpose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father
and child relationship presumed under subdivision (d) or (f) of Section 7611.'").
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status as a civil union partner. 77 Two lesbian partners, Lisa
and Janet, entered into a civil union in Vermont. The couple
returned to Virginia where they were domiciled, Lisa was
artificially inseminated, became pregnant, and had a child.
During this time, Janet participated in the decision-making
process, the birth, and the child care responsibilities. The
couple eventually split up and filed for dissolution in
Vermont.
The issues in the dissolution proceeding pertained
primarily to custody and visitation rights. Lisa, the natural
mother, contested Janet's rights as a natural parent entitled
to visitation. Vermont statutory law includes a rebuttable
presumption that a child born during a marriage is the
natural child of both the husband and wife. The statutes also
state that the rights of parties to a civil union shall be the
same as the rights of a married couple with respect to a child
born during the civil union.78
The court ruled that although the Legislature's purpose
in enacting the civil union law was to give "legal equality" to
a civil union partner vis-a-vis a marriage partner,79
parenthood is established without relying on the marital
presumption that a husband or wife is a natural parent. The
court concluded Janet was a parent without relying on the
presumption of a natural parent triggered by marriage or
civil union."0 Although the court did not rely on that statute,
77. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006).
78. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308(4) (2002) ("A person alleged to be a
parent shall be rebuttably presumed to be the natural parent of a child if... (4)
the child is born while the husband and wife are legally married to each
other."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2002) ("The rights of parties to a
civil union, with respect to a child of whom either becomes the natural parent
during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married
couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural
parent during the marriage.").
79. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 968 ("The Legislature's intent in enacting
the civil union laws was to create legal equality between relationships based on
civil unions and those based on marriage.").
80. By doing this the court avoids having to resolve the issue raised by Lisa
concerning the meaning of natural parent as used in the statute. The court
says:
Lisa focuses almost exclusively on the word "natural," finding
in its use the legislative intent that only biological parents can
be parents for purposes of the parentage statute. We find this
to be an overly broad reading of the language. The parentage
act does not include a definition of "parent. It does not state
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it nevertheless recognized that the presumption of legitimacy
of children born during a marriage is "extremely persuasive
evidence of joint parentage." The court acknowledged the
powerful presumption of parentage that applies to Lisa and
Janet once they entered a civil union and had a child. It was
their intent that Janet be IMJ's parent. Janet participated in
parenting responsibilities, and both of the partners regarded
her as a parent to IMJ. And most importantly, the court
stated that if Janet did not qualify as a parent, it leaves IMJ
in the position of having only one parent. 81
Other states have also recently enacted laws that make it
likely their courts will reach a similar result in a similar case.
For instance, Oregon recently passed the Oregon Family
Fairness Act providing that gay and lesbian relationships are
to be treated identical to marriage. The Oregon law is similar
to the law of Vermont in granting same-sex partners rights
and responsibilities equivalent to marriage. 2
Oregon's family law includes provisions about
establishing paternity. According to these provisions, a man
married to a woman who gives birth to a child during their
marriage is rebuttably presumed to be the father of the
child.83 Applying this language to protect the interests of a
lesbian or gay partner means that the partner is presumed to
that only a natural parent is a parent for purposes of the
statute. In fact, the statute is primarily procedural, leaving it
to the courts to define who is a parent for purposes of a
parentage adjudication. Given its origin and history, it is far
more likely that the legislative purpose was to allow for
summary child support adjudication in cases where biological
parenthood is almost indisputable.
Id. at 969 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 970 ("The sperm donor was anonymous and is making no claim to
be IMJ's parent. If Janet had been Lisa's husband, these factors would make
Janet the parent of the child born from the artificial insemination. Because of
the equality of treatment of partners in civil unions, the same result applies to
Lisa.") (citation omitted).
82. H.B. 2007(9)(3), 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007) ("Any privilege,
immunity, right, benefit or responsibility granted or imposed by statute,
administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other law to or on a
spouse with respect to a child of either of the spouses is granted or imposed on
equivalent terms, substantive and procedural, to or on a partner with respect to
a child of either of the partners.").
83. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070(1)(a) (2007) ("The paternity of a person may
be established as follows: A man is rebuttably presumed to be the father of a
child born to a woman if he and the woman were married to each other at the
time of the child's birth, without a judgment of separation, regardless of
whether the marriage is void.").
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be the "father" of the child. Since the term father is not
gender appropriate in lesbian relationships, it makes sense to
substitute parent for father.
In many cases where a lesbian couple decides to have
children, one partner will undergo artificial insemination in
order to conceive and have a child. Oregon Revised Statutes
section 109.243 states that the husband of a woman who
underwent AID in order to have a child is considered the
father of that child. 4 The new law provides the same kind of
protection to a lesbian partner when her partner has a child
through artificial insemination. Again, the language of the
statute is not gender appropriate, but the meaning of the
Family Fairness Act makes it clear that the purpose of the
new law is to bestow parental rights on the lesbian partner in
this situation.
Taking the scenario one step further, after the birth of
the child to the lesbian partner, her partner's name may be
placed on the birth certificate as the child's other parent. The
law provides for this in the case of a married woman who
gives birth to a child as a result of artificial insemination; so,
the law would protect the lesbian partner and the child in the
same way as it protects the father and the child in the case of
a married woman.
V. PROPOSALS FOR PROTECTION OF THE PARENT/CHILD
RELATIONSHIP
The concept of family and most importantly, the concept
of parent, have undergone transformation. Family means
something much different than the nuclear family headed by
a married couple that once was where most children were
raised. Today, with divorce, out-of-marriage births, and
same-sex relationships, the concept of family includes
different arrangements for child-rearing.
As a result, our concept of parent has also changed. A
legal parent may not be the biological parent of a child.
84. Id. § 109.243 (-The relationship, rights and obligations between a child
born as a result of artificial insemination and the mother's husband shall be the
same to all legal intents and purposes as if the child had been naturally and
legitimately conceived by the mother and the mother's husband if the husband
consented to the performance of artificial insemination.").
85. Id. § 432.206(6) ("In the case of a child born to a married woman as a
result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband, the husband's
name shall be entered on the certificate.").
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Instead, the parent may be the stepparent who has provided
nurture and sustenance for a child who has a different
biological parent. And as discussed above, the parent may be
the same-sex partner of the natural parent who has raised
the child and wants to continue to have a relationship with
the child even after the relationship ends.
Unfortunately, some of these parents-child relationships
do not enjoy adequate legal protection. Although the
emotional connection and dependency of a parent-child
relationship exists, the legal system provides uncertain
protection for that relationship. It is most uncertain in the
case of gay and lesbian parent partners who choose to co-
parent with a natural or adoptive parent. The uncertainty of
the legal relationship poses a risk to the parents, to the
children, and to society.
First, with respect to the partner/parent, he or she has no
assurance of a long-term, stable relationship with their child.
It may be that once the relationship ends, protracted
litigation will be necessary to secure a continuing relationship
with their child.
In the end, that may not be enough to protect the parents'
rights. Second, the child's interest in having the relationship
with his or her social parent protected is also vulnerable.86
Finally, it is damaging to our society if our laws do not
adequately protect the interests of our most vulnerable, our
children. 7
Most likely, states are not going to change their stance
with respect to recognition of same-sex marriage or even with
86. See Latham, supra note 47, at 238 (clarifying that bonding and
attachment theory hold that stability and continuity in a child's relationship
with parents is critical to the child's development. If a parent does not have a
way to make sure that the law protects that relationship, the child's health
could be seriously damaged).
87. Meezan & Rauch, supra note 4, at 97 ("A second important question is
how same-sex marriage might affect children who are already being raised by
same-sex couples. Meezan and Rauch observe that marriage confers on children
three types of benefits that seem likely to carry over to children in same-sex
families. First, marriage may increase children's material well-being through
such benefits as family leave from work and spousal health insurance eligibility.
It may also help ensure financial continuity, should a spouse die or be disabled.
Second, same-sex marriage may benefit children by increasing the durability
and stability of their parents' relationship. Finally, marriage may bring
increased social acceptance of and support for same-sex families although those
benefits might not materialize in communities that meet same-sex marriage
with rejection or hostility.").
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respect to the creation of civil union laws in the near future.
However, regardless of how one comes out on the same-sex
marriage/partnership debate, the parent-child relationships
created in same-sex families continues to raise legal issues for
these parents and their children.
Parents who enter into same-sex relationships know the
risks. They know that their rights and responsibilities as
partners and as parents will not be given the legal legitimacy
that partners and parents in a marriage have. Although a
state might recognize the parent-child relationship as the
courts in California did, other state courts most likely will
not. Even if a court did recognize this relationship, obtaining
legal recognition would be a very costly and lengthy process.
The partners know this going into the relationship, but
the children do not. Despite the children's bond to a parent;
the failure of the law to recognize the bond will have an
impact regardless of whether the family is together or
separated. While the family is together, the state's
unwillingness to treat the relationship as legal burdens the
children both economically and psychologically. 8  Once the
family unit breaks up, the children may experience a loss of a
parent, including the psychological and financial losses. And
there will be no recourse for the children.
The current unwillingness of state legislatures to
recognize same-sex partnerships as family units has an
unintended consequence of creating a class of children who
are destined to be treated differently than children who have
two parents who are legally responsible for them. Children
raised in same-sex families do not have the same right to
expect that both partners will be legally responsible for them.
For instance, if a partner should die or leave, there is no legal
protection for the child to inherit or be protected financially
after the parent is gone.
A. Children's Constitutional Right to Protection of
Parent / Child Relationship
In Plyler v. Doe, 9 the U.S. Supreme Court faced the
constitutionality of a Texas statute that authorized school
districts to deny children access to public education if they
88. Id.
89. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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were not citizens or legally admitted aliens to the United
States. A class action, on behalf of children who could not
establish their status as citizens or legal aliens and were
denied admission to public schools, was brought against the
Tyler, Texas School District.
The Court recognized that the parents, who may be
illegal aliens, of these children cannot be considered members
of a suspect class. The parents voluntarily chose to come to
the United States without following immigration laws. They
put themselves in a situation where they broke the law and
must pay the consequences. 90
On the other hand, the Court recognizes that the children
were involuntarily put into the situation they find themselves
in. They did not ask to be illegally present in the United
States without an ability to attend public school.91 The Court
says:
The children who are plaintiff in these cases are special
members of the underclass. Persuasive arguments
support the view that a State may withhold its
beneficence from those whose very presence within the
United States is the product of their own unlawful
conduct. These arguments do not apply with the same
force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor
children of such illegal entrants. At the least, those who
elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of
our law should be prepared to bear the consequences,
including, but not limited to, deportation. But the
children of those illegal entrants are not comparably
situated. Their "parents have the ability to conform their
conduct to societal norms," and presumably the ability to
remove themselves from the State's jurisdiction; but the
children who are plaintiffs in these cases "can affect
neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." Even
if the State found it expedient to control the conduct of
adults by acting against their children, legislation
directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his
children does not comport with fundamental conceptions
of justice. "Visiting . . .condemnation on the head of an
infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing
disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some
90. Id. at 219.
91. Id. at 220.
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relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and
penalizing the ... child is an ineffectual as well as unjust-
way of deterring the parent."92
The same kind of situation exists for children born in
same-sex families. The partners have decided to create a
family unit not recognized or protected by state law in most
states. The consequence of this decision is that a child born
into this family may not be legally entitled to two parents.
The debate on the legitimacy of same-sex partnerships
has concentrated largely on the partners' relationship with
one another and the fairness of treating the relationship like
a marriage. But when considering the right of a child to have
the parent/child relationship recognized between the two
partners who intend to be his or her parent, the debate
should focus on the children, rather than the partners. It is
the child who is being treated differently from a child born
into a family where the parents are married.
By enacting laws that prohibit legal recognition of same-
sex relationships, the states disadvantage these children. The
children face the prospect of not having or losing the
relationship with one of their parents. A child born to a
heterosexual couple does not face this problem. Children
born of heterosexual couples are presumed to be the legal
child of their mothers' husband if the couple is married, and
there are filiation processes available if they are not married.
Although in some states adoption is a process that may
afford a child born to a same-sex couple legal protection,
many states do not permit adoption by a same-sex partner.
Although a court might, as the California Supreme Court did,
bestow parental rights to a same-sex partner,93 that is by no
means a certain outcome. No doubt the climate in California
was receptive to this outcome given the passage of the
Domestic Partnership Law in California. 4
The Supreme Court has struck down state laws in other
cases that discriminated against a class of children in an
impermissible manner.95 It is possible that the same could
92. Id. at 219-20 (citations omitted).
93. See supra notes 65-74.
94. See supra note 24 and accompanying statutory provisions.
95. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking down an Illinois
statute that allowed children born out of marriage to inherit from their mothers
but not their fathers).
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happen with the laws that currently make it impossible for a
child to be legally connected with both parents when the
parents form a same-sex partnership and form a family.
Laws in states that restrict the meaning of family have an
adverse impact on children born in those families and treat
them differently than children born to married parents. And
in some cases, it is impossible for the children to have more
than one parent.
Whether or not the laws discriminate against the
children in this class in an impermissible manner is
important to consider. It makes sense to devise a way to
protect the children regardless of whether or not the state
recognizes the same-sex relationship as marriage or legal
partnership.
B. Protecting the Children in Same-Sex Families
The debate about recognition of same-sex partnerships as
equivalent to marriage has centered on the rights of the
partners, rather than the rights of the children. Although a
good deal of the debate has centered on marriage as being the
place where procreation occurs and where we want to
encourage the rearing of children, much less is said about the
parent-child relationship in that context.
Where the state recognizes the relationship, the parent-
child relationship is assured by the laws that protect partners
in the same way that married spouses are protected. But
where the law does not afford that protection, it is doubtful
that protection is available.
To protect the parent-child relationship, states should
consider legitimizing the relationship by enacting a law
creating a presumption that the partner of a parent who gives
birth to or adopts a child is legally presumed to be the parent
of the child. For instance, the proposed statute could provide
as follows:
A person who is living in a committed same-sex
relationship when his or her partner gives birth to or
adopts a child shall be presumed to be a legal parent of
the child.
The statute takes care of establishing the connection
between the child and both parents and is silent on the issue
of legal recognition of the relationship between the two
parents. States that do not want to recognize the same-sex
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partnership are given consideration, but this statute still
affords protection to the child who was intended to be the
child of both parents.
A statute such as this one is analogous to the presumed
father statutes that presuppose the husband of a married
woman who gives birth to a child is the legal father of the
child born during the marriage.96 Statutes like these provide
protection to the child and to the parent as well. It makes
sense to consider adopting a statute like this to protect the
parent and the child in a same-sex relationship.
There are several reasons why a state may be willing to
adopt a statute like the one proposed. First, the children who
are not protected face the prospect of being in a situation
where they have but one legal parent. The children risk
losing the relationship they establish with one of their
parents should the partnership ever breakup. This means
both emotional and economic loss to the children. It also
means that the parent faces significant losses that cannot be
protected.
Society is also at risk. Children will not have the support
of both their parents which constitutes a social loss. Our
society will sanction an underclass of children who do not
have the love and support of two parents, which ultimately
puts these children and society at greater risk.
To the extent the debate is focused on the children and
their needs, the debate moves away from the morality of
same-sex relationships. Of course, it is true that a same-sex
relationship is at the center of this issue, but if we focus the
debate on the children, our concerns are different. How best
can we provide for the children regardless of whether or not
we approve of their family relationship? Additionally, even if
a state does not permit same-sex marriage or partnership,
most states take no legal position on whether or not same-sex
couples can have and raise children. In taking no position,
the states are accepting what is fact: many children are
raised in same-sex families.
96. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308(4) (2002) ("A person alleged to be a
parent shall be rebuttably presumed to be the natural parent of a child .. . (4)
the child is born while the husband and wife are legally married to each
other.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
The debate about recognition of same-sex partnerships
has missed the mark when it comes to the children who are
born and raised in same-sex families in large numbers. To
the extent that the debate has focused on the morality of the
same-sex relationship, it has ignored the reality of the
children.
Establishing the link between a child and two parents
can be critical to the child's welfare. For children born to a
married mother, the marriage links her husband to her child
as the presumed father of the child. The paternity process
provides a vehicle for linking a father to his child. Adoption
and other doctrines also can be used to establish the link
between a parent and a child.
A same-sex couple who chooses to have children faces
greater challenges in making the legal connection between
the child and both parents. Where a state allows second-
parent adoption for a same-sex partner, the parent bond is
legally created. But this process is not available in all states
and wherever it is, it can be a cumbersome process.
Otherwise, a partner can rely on the in loco parentis doctrine
to secure rights to a child. But this doctrine does not insure a
partner's legal connection to a child, and often, the rights of
the natural parent will trump the rights of the other partner.
In a state that sanctions same-sex marriage or a
partnership equivalent to marriage, the legal connection
between a partner and a child will flow from the rights that
arise from creating the legal relationship, as it does with
heterosexual marriage. Embedded in the law is protection for
both the parent and the child.
In states that do not recognize same-sex relationships,
there is no protection for the parent who does not give birth to
or adopt a child resulting from a relationship between the
partners.
This result leaves many children born to same-sex
couples in a vulnerable situation. Regardless of what we may
believe is appropriate protection for the partners in a same-
sex relationship, we need to do more to foster protection for
children born in same-sex couple families. Without legal
protection, these children are likely to have only one legally
recognized parent, which triggers ensuing problems for the
children. Ultimately, this paper proposes a way to provide
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these children protection without debating the complexities
surrounding same-sex marriage.

